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There has been a recent resurgence in psycholinguistic experimental studies testing linguistic 
relativity – the view, associated with Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956), that the language we speak 
influences our perception and understanding of the environment. Furthermore, recent experimental 
work in evolutionary linguistics in the Iterated Learning Model applied to humans (e.g., Kirby, 
Cornish, & Smith, 2008) has proved to be successful at explaining how language transmission can 
shape its properties. In light of these findings, the research presented here unprecedentedly embarks 
on testing linguistic relativity from an evolutionary perspective. It is demonstrated that language 
transmission of two qualitatively different languages evolved in the experiment by Matthews, Kirby, 
& Cornish (in prep.) – one that promotes the distinction between rotated and unrotated shapes and the 
other that does not – influences perception of these shapes. This finding suggests that language 
evolution shapes the conceptual system (semantics) in the speakers’ minds by propagating the ways 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
‘We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. (…)We cut 
nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an 
agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the 
patterns of our language.’ (Whorf, 1956:213) 
  
Whether and to what extent our native language influences the way we perceive, understand and think 
about the world, as long time ago suggested by Benjamin Lee Whorf, has fascinated researchers and 
laypeople alike.  
Each of us has probably wondered at some point whether cultural differences, including language, can 
influence our perception and thinking to the extent where it would be impossible to communicate 
about certain issues.  
Although answers to this question will largely remain in the domain of our experiences, the interest in 
the relationship between the linguistic system and other cognitive domains, referred to as linguistic 
relativity, has recently enjoyed resurgence in psychological and psycholinguistic research.  
Numerous studies in a number of different cognitive domains, such as, for example, spatial cognition 
(e.g., Levinson, 1996), number cognition (e.g., Gordon, 2004), shape (e.g., Kuo & Sera, 2008) and 
colour (e.g., Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006) have found support for linguistic relativity.  
These findings can be interpreted as suggesting that our native language mingles with the make-up of 
our conceptual system and its semantics. However, their explanatory power has a serious limitation - 
they do not explain how this mingling happens. In other words, explanations that are offered by 
psychological studies testing linguistic relativity are synchronic and thus do not take into account 
evolutionary processes that shape language and cognition. In this study we bridge this gap and 
investigate the influence of language evolution on the evolution of semantics. 
An evolutionary approach to linguistic relativity is motivated by a recently growing body of evidence 
that humans, by evolving linguistic categories (labels), have introduced into their lives an immense 
evolutionary advantage over non-human animals that have not evolved any language-like 
communication systems. This advantage enables humans to learn quicker (e.g., Lupyan, Rakison, & 
8 
 
McClelland, 2007) and communicate better (e.g., Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) – to name just two skills 
we excel at due to our ability to use language.  
But of what evolutionary advantage could we speak if we found that evolution of different languages 
causes changes in semantics of conceptual systems in their speakers? The advantage would be 
enormous. Such a finding would indicate that language evolution shapes semantics in a way that 
guarantees communicational intelligibility in given speech communities. In other words, the finding 
that language evolution shapes semantics in a speech community would mean that what people within 
this community communicate to each other about the world is perceived and understood in the same 
way by all community members. This would further indicate that they understand each other better; 
empathise with each other more, and thus are able to maintain good social relationships and overall 
social integrity within the community.  
Apart from theoretical motivations for the current investigation, there is one more, equally important, 
factor that has prompted us to design the current experiment. This factor refers to findings in the 
experiment by Matthews et al. (in prep.) that modelled the evolution of categorisation using the 
Iterated Leaning Model (ILM). 
In the ILM language evolution is modelled as a processes referred to as cultural transmission, 
whereby generations of learners acquire language from each other by means of observational learning 
(cf. e.g., Kirby & Hurford, 2002).  
Matthews et al.’s (in prep.) experiment has resulted in two findings that are crucial to the current 
study. Firstly, they demonstrated that evolving languages were becoming more structured by means of 
organising boundaries of linguistic categories in a continuous meaning space. Secondly, they found 
that some languages organised the meaning space such that they differentiated rotated and unrotated 
elements by assigning different labels to them, whereas some other languages did not distinguish 
between rotated and unrotated elements at all because they assigned identical or very similar labels to 
both of them. 
These two findings constitute a foundation of our research as we hypothesise that the evolution of two 
languages (L1 and L2), chosen from final evolutionary generations in Matthews et al.’s experiment, 
influences the way semantics (i.e., the meaning space) is shaped in the minds of speakers of L1 and 
L2.  
In order to investigate the influence of the evolution of L1 and L2 on the evolution of semantics we 
will measure, in a similarity judgement task, cross-linguistic changes in perception of the meaning 
space after learning the languages. We will test whether perception of the meaning space differs 
between L1 and L2 when its elements lie within a category in L1 and across two categories in L2 
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(Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we will also test whether perception of rotated and unrotated shapes 
differs between L1 and L2 which differentiate and do not differentiate rotation respectively 
(Hypothesis 2). 
The last question that needs to be addressed is this: why would cross-linguistic differences in 
perception of the meaning space tell us anything about changes in semantics?  
It is commonly assumed in linguistics that symbols, such as linguistic labels, have semantics (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1995). However, very often it is unclear what kind of representations semantics refers to 
and how it is connected to objects in the real world. This situation, referred to as the symbol 
grounding problem (Harnad, 1990), leads to an implausible model of cognition in which symbols 
refer to other symbols which refer yet to other symbols, thus resulting in an unrealistic, disconnected 
from the reality, view of semantics (cf. Searle, 1982 for a Chinese Room argument). 
In the present study, however, the symbol grounding problem is resolved because it is assumed that 
linguistic labels are grounded in action and perception (Barsalou, 1999; Harnad, 1990).This means 
that the semantics of linguistic labels comprises representations of sensorimotor and perceptual 
experience. Therefore, if we observe changes in perception as measured in a similarity judgement 
task, we can infer that there have also been some changes in semantics.  
Our assumption that semantics of symbols is grounded in perception and action is compatible with the 
embodied view of cognition which asserts that human cognitive functions such as language and 
categorisation, among others, incorporate sensorimotor, perceptual and emotional processes (Gallese 
& Lakoff, 2005; Wilson, 2002).  
In the remainder of this dissertation we review the background literature that motivates our 
hypotheses and methodology. In Chapter 2 we review literature on categorical perception (CP) – a 
phenomenon ubiquitous in categorisation that is crucial to our specific assumptions with respect to 
Hypothesis 1. In the same chapter, we also review studies testing linguistic relativity.  In Chapter 3 we 
review studies on adaptiveness of linguistic labels that theoretically motivate our hypotheses by 
suggesting that the finding that language evolution influences the way we perceive and understand the 
world would have an adaptive value. Chapter 4 focuses on the motivations for the ‘cultural 
transmission’ approach to language evolution and reviews findings that together constitute 
background to understanding the ILM and Matthews et al.’s experiment on evolution of 
categorisation. Chapter 5 discusses Matthews et al.’s experiment from the perspective of the current 
study and describes methods and results of the current research. Chapter 6 is devoted to discussion 
and Chapter 7 to conclusions.  
10 
 
Chapter 2 To Cognise is to categorise 
2.1 What is Categorisation? 
Categorisation is a fundamental process underlying human (and non-human animal) cognition that 
allows us to acquire perceptual and abstract knowledge about the environment (Harnad, 1987a; 
Harnad, 2005).  
As suggested by many categorisation researchers (Estes, 1994; Harnad, 1987a; Sloutsky & Fisher, 
2004; Smith, 1989) categorisation is based on induction – that is - a process where we can learn 
something new about an object based on our past experience with similar objects. Thus, induction can 
be understood as an inference in which if we know that X1 is Z, and that X1 and X2 are similar, we 
can conclude that X2 is also Z (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). In other words, categorisation requires 
comparing a new object X2 (e.g., a blackbird) to a known instance, X1, of a category Z (e.g., ‘bird’), 
learning that the two instances are similar because they both have wings, and concluding that X2 (i.e., 
the blackbird) belongs to the same category Z (i.e., ‘bird’) as X1.  It is worth emphasising that X1 and 
X2 are compared based on similarity, thus making this concept fundamental with respect to 
categorisation. 
2.2 Categorical Perception 
In the current study we investigate the perception of a continuous meaning space organised by 
language evolution into distinct categories. Thus, it is important to have a closer look at the exact 
mechanism that allows us to represent the continuous physical environment in the form of separated 
and bounded categories. Categorical perception (henceforth, CP) is such a mechanism. CP allows us 
to perceive sensory continua discontinuously, chunking perceptual spaces into discrete categories. 
Furthermore, CP shapes representations of categories in such a way that it increases similarity 
between representations of members of the same category and decreases similarity between 
representations of members of different categories (Harnad, 1987a). If we assume that similarity 
between two objects is represented as distance in a cognitive similarity space between the 
representations of these objects (Shepard, 1974)
1
, then we can say that CP results in within-category 
similarity space compression and between-category similarity space expansion. As a result discrete 
and easily discriminable category representations are formed. 
CP was first observed in speech (Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957). Liberman and 
colleagues demonstrated that sounds /ba/ and /da/ which varied systematically along the voice-onset 
                                                          
1
 In §6.3.3 we discuss the relevance of the concept of similarity to our research in more detail. 
2 The Dani were claimed by Rosch Heider and Olivier (1972) to have just two basic colour terms. 
3 Berinmo is a language spoken in Papua New-Guinea. 
4 ‘Nol’ covers green, blue and purple; ‘wor’ covers yellow, orange, brown and khaki. 
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time continuum, were discriminated more accurately when they were in different phonemic categories 
(i.e., one in /ba/, another in /da/), compared to when they were in the same phonemic category (i.e., 
both in /ba/, or both in /da/). Similar speech CP effects were also found in prelinguistic infants (e.g., 
Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971), as well as in non-human animals (e.g., 1987; Kuhl & 
Miller, 1975; Snowdon, 1987). 
Furthermore, CP effects have also been detected in other domains, such as, for example, colour 
perception (e.g., Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006; Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; Winawer 
et al., 2007; Özgen & Davies, 1998) face perception (e.g., Beale & Keil, 1995; Goldstone, Lippa, & 
Shiffrin, 2001; Levin & Beale, 2000), and interval perception in musicians (e.g., Burns & Ward, 
1978), as well as in neural networks during category learning (e.g., Harnad, Hanson, & Lubin, 1995; 
Nakisa & Plunkett, 1998). 
It is worth noting, however, that, although CP is ubiquitous in categorisation, it is also possible to 
categorically interpret sensory continua without there being CP at work (cf. Ladd & Morton, 1997). 
Categorisation without CP effects has been demonstrated, for example, for lexical tones in tone 
languages (Francis, Ciocca, & Ng, 2003) and for vowels (Stevens, Liberman, Studdert-Kennedy, & 
Ohman, 1969). 
2.3 Universalist versus Relativist Debate 
Although on the surface CP appears to solely concern perceptual categorisation, it is crucial to note 
that since language labels a large number of our perceptual categories, it is also likely to influence CP 
(Harnad, 1987b). In fact, the influence of language on perception and CP is central to the current 
experiment.  
There are two views on the relation between perception and language in the literature (cf. Regier & 
Kay, 2009). The first view, referred to as universalist, postulates the existence of universal tendencies 
with respect to perception of sensory stimuli that, instead of being influenced by languages, influence 
languages themselves (e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969; Rosch Heider & Olivier, 1972; Rosch, 1973). In this 
view, CP effects are considered universal and do not differ across languages. The second view, 
associated with Whorf (1956) and referred to as linguistic relativity, postulates that our perception of 
sensory stimuli is influenced by the language we speak (Kay & Kempton, 1984; Roberson, Davidoff, 
& Shapiro, 2002; Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; Winawer et al., 2007; Özgen & Davies, 1998) 
Accordingly, CP effects are shaped by cross-linguistic differences with respect to linguistic category 
labelling.  
In what follows I focus on demonstrating arguments of both universalists and relativists with respect 
to the relation between language and perception in the domain of colour. This domain has been 
chosen due to its representativeness of the debate (cf. Regier & Kay, 2009).  Although the domain of 
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visually perceived shape is relevant to the current experiment it will not be reviewed here due to the 
space limit (cf. e.g., Rosch, (1973) – for a universalist view, and Roberson et al., (2002) – for a 
linguistic relativist view). 
2.3.1 The Case of Colour 
In 1969, Berlin and Kay proposed that there exist universal focal colours around which labelled 
colour categories are organised in all languages. To test Berlin and Kay’s (1969) influential proposal, 
Rosch Heider & Olivier (1972) performed a number of experiments that compared colour naming and 
memory between American-English speakers and the Dugum Dani (henceforth, the Dani), an 
agricultural population in Irian Jaya, Indonesia. 
For example, one of their experiments was claimed to support the universal perception of colour space 
by showing that there was no difference between English-American speakers and the Dani with 
respect to how colours were remembered, despite the differences in colour vocabularies of these two 
populations
2
 . Such a result appeared to indicate that colour labels do not influence the memory of 
colours in either of the participating group. Thus, the Whorf hypothesis was concluded not to be 
supported.   
However, Rosch Heider and Olivier’s (1972) studies were reported to have flaws in the design and the 
interpretation of results (cf. Lucy, 1997; Saunders & van Brakel, 1997). Given this, Roberson et al.’s 
(2000) study seems to be of particular importance since not only did it fail to replicate Rosch Heider 
and Olivier’s (1972) results, but it also performed a number of new experiments that supported 
linguistic relativity.  
In one of their experiments (Experiment 4), Roberson et al. (2000) investigated perception of colours 
in the populations of English and Berinmo
3
 speakers. They focused on a between-group comparison 
of CP effects with respect to colours that straddled the green-blue and nol-wor colour boundary. 
Colours on the former boundary are labelled only in English, whereas colours on the latter boundary 
only in Berinmo
4
. Roberson et al. (2000) used an odd-one-out matching triad task, where participants 
had to choose two most similar stimuli out of three. The stimuli consisted of Munsell chips which 
were manipulated such that in each triad (1) all chips were in one category; or (2) two were in one 
category, and one on a boundary; or (3) two were in one category and one in another. In each triad the 
distances between chips (in Munsell steps) were equal. Participants’ choices in the task were used to 
calculate CP effects for each language group. 
It was predicted that if colour labels influence colour perception, then CP effects should be observed 
for the nol-wor boundary only in Berinmo speakers and for the green-blue boundary only in English 
                                                          
2 The Dani were claimed by Rosch Heider and Olivier (1972) to have just two basic colour terms. 
3 Berinmo is a language spoken in Papua New-Guinea. 
4 ‘Nol’ covers green, blue and purple; ‘wor’ covers yellow, orange, brown and khaki. 
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speakers. Roberson et al. (2000) found CP effects significantly more often for the green-blue 
boundary than for the nol-wor boundary for English speakers and the reverse for Berinmo speakers. 
However, although performance of both Berinmo and English speakers was at chance with respect to 
the colour boundaries not existing in their respective languages, there was no significant difference 
between performance of Berinmo and English speakers with respect to the green-blue boundary. 
Roberson et al. (2000) interpreted this finding as a possibility that, perhaps, there was a universal 
principle governing the categorisation of greens and blues.  
In order to exclude this possibility, Berinmo and English speakers were taught to sort Munsell chips 
into two piles, one with the category boundary set at the green-blue boundary, as in the previous 
experiment, and another with an arbitrary category boundary dividing the green spectrum into green1 
and green2 (Roberson et al. 2000; Experiment 5). Crucial here was the inclusion of the green1-green2 
boundary that was arbitrary for both Berinmo and English speakers. 
It was predicted that, if greens and blues perception is not governed by some universal perception 
principles – contrary to what still remained a possibility in Experiment 4 – then, Berinmo speakers 
would find it as difficult to learn to sort stimuli into green1 and green2 categories as they would find 
to learn to sort them into blue and green categories. By contrast, English speakers were predicted to 
find it harder to learn to classify stimuli straddling the green1-green2 boundary than the green-blue-
boundary. 
Both these predictions were confirmed and Roberson et al. (2000) concluded that colours in Berinmo 
and English are categorised according to colour terms available in their respective languages
5
.  
Roberson et al. (2000) is only one among many other studies claiming to support Whorfian hypothesis 
in the domain of colour. Similar results were found by Kay & Kempton (1984). They found between-
category expansion of similarity space close to the blue-green category boundary for English, but no 
such effect for Tarahumar, a language spoken in Northern Mexico that does not label a distinction 
between blue and green, but instead names this part of colour spectrum ‘siyòname’ (Experiment 1). 
More recently, Őzgen & Davies (1998) found evidence for linguistic relativity with respect to Turkish 
which has two basic terms for blue (lacivert and mavi). In a sorting task, where participating adults 
were required to sort light-blue and dark-blue stimuli into two piles based on their similarity, Ozgen 
and Davies found that Turkish speakers were more likely than English speakers, who use just one 
label for blue, to put stimuli into two separate categories. In a subsequent similarity judgement task, 
where participants were asked to rate similarity of stimuli pairs, Turkish speakers demonstrated 
                                                          
5 Findings in Roberson et al.’s (2000) last two experiments (i.e., Experiments 6a-6b) further support the Whorf hypothesis by 
confirming their previous results, but in a different task – a two alternative forced choice task. 
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decreased between-category similarity (i.e., stimuli that crossed the lacivert-mavi boundary were 
judged less similar) compared to no such effect for English speakers.  
Winawer et al. (2007) found evidence for the Whorf hypothesis with respect to Russian blues. They 
found that Russian speakers were faster at discrimination of colour stimuli ranging from light to dark 
blue when stimuli straddled the lexicalised category boundary siniy-goluboy, compared to when the 
stimuli were in the same lexicalised category, siniy or goluboy. By contrast, English speakers were 
equally fast in both conditions. 
A pioneering study by Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry  (2006) demonstrated that the Whorf effect is 
present only in the Right Visual Field (RVF). Crucially, this idea is a consequence of the fact that 
language is mainly located in the Left Hemisphere (LH) and that projections from visual fields are 
processed contralaterally. Thus, if linguistic relativity is to be supported, it is predicted to involve only 
the RVF.  
In a pre-experimental task participants established the linguistically labelled blue-green boundary. 
The main experiment involved a visual search task in which participants were instructed to state if the 
target stimulus was located in the left or the right half of the computer screen. Stimuli consisted of 
coloured squares surrounding centrally located fixation point. All stimuli were the same colour 
(distracters) apart from one square (target) which was different. In order to investigate CP effects, the 
distracters and the target were included in the same category (e.g., containing blues) or in two 
different categories (e.g., one containing blues and the other greens). The CP effect – that is – an 
improved discriminability of between-category colours, compared to the within-category 
discriminability, was found only in the RVF.  
Some recent findings that will not be reviewed here due to the space limit  reveal a complicated 
picture suggesting that also universal colour  naming constraints should be incorporated into a fully 
explanatory account of colour categorisation (cf. e.g., Kay & Regier, 2007; Lindsey & Brown, 2006). 
However, in light of the abundance of evidence in favour of linguistic relativity, the current consensus 
is that colour perception and categorisation is influenced by the language one speaks and that this 
influence can be observed in the RVF (cf. Regier & Kay, 2009).  
2.4 CP as Affected by Development 
Our expectations with respect to the first hypothesis of the current experiment that CP effects will be 
induced during language transmission are supported by the profusion of studies demonstrating that CP 
mechanisms are extremely flexible and that they are shaped by language learning. This flexibility can 
be demonstrated not only when we compare CP effects cross-linguistically, but also when we 
compare participants speaking the same language but at different developmental stages. 
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For example, Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, & Davies (2005) have demonstrated that, both Himba 
and English toddlers show CP for the blue-purple category boundary before they have acquired any 
colour labels. However, in accordance with linguistic relativity, CP effects for the blue-purple 
boundary are no longer present in the Himba, after they have acquired their language’s colour terms 
(Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005).  
In addition, Franklin, Drivonikou, Bevis, et al. (2008a) demonstrated that colour CP in prelinguistic 4-
6 month old infants is only present in the LVF. Given the findings by Gilbert et al. (2006) that CP 
effects in adults are found only in the RVF, it is possible that the switch from the LVF to the RVF is a 
developmental change and takes place due to the influence of acquisition of colour labels. This 
possibility was tested by Franklin, Drivonikou, Clifford, et al. (2008b). They demonstrated that 32 
month old toddlers, who were in the process of learning colour labels (referred to as ‘learerns’), 
demonstrated CP effects in the LFV. By contrast, 46 month olds, who have mastered accurate use and 
understanding of colour terms (referred to as ‘namers’), demonstrated CP effects in the RVF. Notably, 
the scope of CP effects did not differ between ‘learners’ and ‘namers’.   
2.5 CP Effects in Artificial Category Learning  
On linguistic relativity view, the same meaning space can be perceived differently by language A and 
B, if, for example, language A has just one label (category) to refer to it, while language B has two. 
Similarly, in an artificial category learning experiment the perceptual dimension can be perceived 
differently relative to the number of labels (artificial categories) that are assigned to it. Given this, we 
can expect to find similar effects in the current study – that is - shape stimuli are predicted to be 
perceived differently or identically, depending on whether their similarity would be judged by 
speakers of languages that labelled them differently or identically. 
Between-category expansion and within-category compression (i.e., CP effects) have been 
demonstrated as a result of artificial category learning in a number of studies using different 
perceptual stimuli. For example, CP effects have been demonstrated for continua of familiar faces 
(Beale & Keil, 1995), continua of unfamiliar and inverted faces (Levin & Beale, 2000), or animal 
body parts and artificial cells (Livingston, Andrews, & Harnad, 1998). However, Goldstone’s  
(1994a) experiment will be described in more detail because it uses geometrical figures as stimuli, as 
in our experiment . 
Goldstone (1994a, Experiment 2) conducted an artificial category learning experiment investigating 
how perception of stimuli continuously differing along two perceptual dimensions, such as, size and 
brightness, changes as a result of assigning two labels (A and B) to the stimuli. The stimuli consisted 
of 16 squares arranged in a matrix 4x4, where horizontally and vertically adjacent squares differed in 
their size and brightness, respectively. Participants were assigned to three conditions: size and 
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brightness categorisers and a control group. Size categorisers learned with feedback to categorise 
stimuli organised such that two left columns of the matrix were labelled A and two right columns 
were labelled B. By contrast, brightness categorisers learned with feedback to categorise stimuli such 
that two top and bottom rows belonged to categories A and B, respectively.  
After learning, all participants performed a same/different discrimination task, where they were 
presented with a pair of squares, appearing on the screen successively, and required to respond S (for 
same) or D (for different). The stimuli were pairs of squares that differed in size and brightness for 
size and brightness categorisers respectively, and that were inside a category (within-category pairs) 
or across categories (between-category pairs).  
Goldstone predicted that size and brightness categorisers would make fewer errors than the control 
group in their perceptual discriminations of between-category pairs. This process, referred to by 
Goldstone as acquired distinctiveness, can be thought of as a between-category expansion of 
similarity space. He also predicted that both size and brightness categorisers would make more errors 
than the control group in their perceptual discriminations of within-category pairs. This process, 
referred to by Goldstone as acquired equivalence, can be considered as a within-category 
compression of similarity space. Goldstone’s results demonstrated acquired distinctiveness effect for 
both size and brightness categorisers, but no acquired equivalence effect.  
The ideas of acquired distinctiveness and acquired equivalence serve as a motivation for our first 
hypothesis suggesting differential perception of shape pairs depending on whether they are labelled 




Chapter 3 Adaptive role of language labels 
3.1 Human versus non-human animal communication systems 
There is a great qualitative gap between animal and human vocal communication systems. An animal 
communication system uses largely innate object-signal associations only
6
 (e.g., vervet monkeys use 
three types of distinct alarm calls as a response to the appearance of an eagle, a leopard or a snake 
(Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980)). By contrast, language uses learnt and largely arbitrary 
associations between objects and symbols, as well as symbols and other symbols
7
.  
Although it has been demonstrated that non-human animals in captivity are able to learn to understand 
and produce single symbols and language-like symbolic sequences (e.g., bottlenose dolphins –
Herman (1984); sea lions – Schusterman & Gisiner (1988); a chimpanzee named Nim – Terrace, 
Petitto, Sanders, & Bever (1979); a bonobo named Kanzi – Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993)), they do 
not seem to be able to use these learning abilities in the wild. Thus, the observed non-human animal 
linguistic abilities seem to be due to captive enculturation (cf. Bering, 2004).  
The ability of humans to use symbols, including language labels, has a great evolutionary advantage 
over non-human animals, which lack this skill, because it increases availability of strategies that can 
be used during learning and communication, thus increasing humans’ overall fitness.  
This chapter concentrates on demonstrating that having linguistic labels is adaptive.  In other words, 
we will attempt to demonstrate that linguistic labels allow humans to be better category learners and 
communicators. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated here will serve to motivate our assumption 
that a crucial link exists between categorical perception and the evolution of language labels, and 
hence language. 
3.2 Sensorimotor Toil versus Symbolic Theft 
Cangelosi, Greco, & Harnad (2000), using a three-layer feed-forward neural network, modelled two 
types of category learning. The first type, ‘sensorimotor toil’, refers to learning new categories via 
trial-and-error with feedback, basing the learner’s knowledge on her sensorimotor and perceptual 
experiences. The second type, ‘symbolic theft’, refers to learning new categories with aid of linguistic 
labels without the need to ground all categories in experience.  
In their model, the neural network learned via ‘sensorimotor toil’ names of perceptual prototypical 
categories. It also learned via ‘symbolic theft’ to associate these grounded category names with novel 
‘higher order’ labels - symmetric and asymmetric. During testing, it was demonstrated that, when 
                                                          
6 An obvious counterexample is animal song that is largely learnt (cf. Merker & Okanoya, 2007) 
7 We use Deacon's (1997) terminology here, where ‘symbol’ can refer to words or phrases.  
18 
 
presented with visual input, the network was capable of producing ‘high order’ categories (i.e., 
symmetric or asymmetric) with 80% success rate.   
Assuming that Cangelosi et al’s (2000) model is a plausible model of the first stages of language 
acquisition, it can be concluded that its performance during testing demonstrates that ‘symbolic theft’ 
can indeed be a very successful category acquisition strategy.  
3.3 Advantage of Learning via Symbolic Theft in a Miniature 
Evolutionary Scenario 
Cangelosi et al.’s (2000) model demonstrates that ‘symbolic theft’ is a plausible strategy of efficient 
category acquisition. However, Cangelosi & Harnad (2002) emphasise the advantage of this strategy 
even more by demonstrating that ‘symbolic theft’ is more adaptive than ‘sensorimotor toil’ in a 
miniature evolutionary scenario. 
They compare performance of artificial agents foraging in a simulated environment (cf. Parisi, 1997) 
that have to learn to distinguish four types of mushrooms: those with feature A or B must be eaten or 
marked respectively, those with features AB must be eaten, marked and returned to, and those with 
features C, D or E must be ignored.  
During the first set of 200 simulations foragers learn via ‘sensorimotor toil’ and their population is 
subjected to selection and reproduction, using a genetic algorithm (Goldberg, 1989). After genetic 
evolution, the foragers are divided into two groups (i.e., ‘toilers’ and ‘thieves’) in which they learn in 
two stages. 
Firstly, both ‘toilers’ and ‘thieves’ learn via ‘sensorimotor toil’ to eat and mark mushrooms A and B, 
and to produce an appropriate call (i.e., EAT and MARK, respectively). However, they do not learn to 
respond to ‘return’ mushrooms. 
In the second stage, ‘toilers’ learn to return to mushrooms AB and to produce the appropriate call 
(RETURN) via reception of mushrooms’ visual features as input. By contrast, when ‘thieves’ learn 
the action of returning and the corresponding call (RETURN), they are fed only the call (RETURN) 
as input. In other words, instead of learning to respond appropriately based on the experience with 
perceptual features of mushrooms AB, ‘thieves’ learn from hearing their label. Because this label is 
indirectly grounded in the experience of mushrooms A and B separately, they are able to understand 
it. 
In order to establish which strategy had an evolutionary advantage, the number of returned 
mushrooms was compared between ‘toilers’ and ‘thieves’. Given that ‘thieves’ returned more 
mushrooms than ‘toilers’, it was concluded that ‘symbolic theft’ is a more adaptive label learning 
strategy than ‘sensorimotor toil’. 
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3.4 Other Experiments Demonstrating Adaptive Advantage of 
Linguistic Labels 
There is evidence in child language development literature that children discriminate labelled objects 
better than unlabelled objects (Xu, 2002). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that redundant 
linguistic labels that were correlated with categories of solid and non-solid things facilitated learning 
of these categories in two-year old children (Yoshida & Smith, 2005).  
In addition, Lupyan, Rakison, & McClelland (2007) demonstrate that participants learn to categorise 
stimuli (pictures of aliens) more quickly when stimuli are labelled with written (Experiment 1) or 
auditory (Experiment 2) non-words (leebish and grecious), compared to when they have no labels, or 
when the label is a proposition  and not a single word (Experiment 2).  
What is crucial in Lupyan et al.’s (2007) experiment is that stimuli could also be categorised without 
labels, according to perceptually salient differences in two perceptual dimensions. Yet, the addition of  
labels that did  not supply any information about stimuli, resulted in accuracy of 80% in categorisation 
after only 30 training trials, as opposed to 72 training trials in the group where labels were absent. 
The result that people better categorise novel stimuli with labels than stimuli without labels could be 
due to the finding that conceptual knowledge, to which labels contribute,  facilitates visual processing 
on-line by means of supplying top-down feedback (Lupyan, 2008; Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & 
Swingley, 2010).  
Steels & Belpaeme (2005) , using simulations with artificial agents playing perceptual discrimination 
and guessing games, also emphasise the adaptive role of language labels (cf. Belpaeme & Bleys, 2005 
for a similar account). 
They demonstrate that, while learning to categorise the colour space according to statistical 
distributions of colours from real-world colour samples
8
, as opposed to learning from a sample of 
random data, helps agents to form categories that are shared in a population to a certain degree, it does 
not result in a complete sharing of the categories that would be required for efficient communication.  
Furthermore, Steels and Belpaeme suggest that the best way to guarantee the acquisition of a shared 
colour category system in a population is to learn categories coupled with language labels. They 
support this point by showing, in a number of simulations, that individualistic learning via a 
perceptual discrimination game does not result in a perfectly shared system of colour categories, as 
well as that genetic evolution requires too long a time to evolve such a system to be an ecologically 
plausible solution (it would take about 400 years to evolve a shared colour category repertoire in a 
population of 10 humans, assuming a new generation appeared every 20 years). Furthermore, they 
                                                          
8 Real-world colour stimuli were obtained from photographs of natural and urban environments. 
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demonstrate that the acquisition of shared colour categories in a language guessing game, whereby the 
hearer learns to identify a colour category by means of hearing a name associated with it from the 
speaker, results in a shared colour category system that enables successful communication. The 
adaptive role of language labels in the acquisition of a shared colour category system in a language 
guessing game seems even more impressive if we take into account that agents learned to categorise 
the colour space from stimuli without any realistic statistical distributions of colours. 
Since, as we have seen, language labels have an adaptive role by enabling their users to learn and 
induce new categories very effectively, it appears reasonable to suggest, as we do here, that language 
and categorical perception co-evolved, one bound and affected by the other. This suggestion 
motivates our hypothesis that language evolution causes changes in semantics of conceptual systems 




Chapter 4 Language evolution 
4.1 Language complexity: compositionality 
 All animal communication systems are structured to certain extent. Some systems, such as bird song 
(e.g., Kroodsma & Parker, 1977) or the song of humpback whales (Payne, 2000) can even be very 
complex structurally. Furthermore, symbolic systems can be taught to animals in captivity (cf. § 3.1). 
Even more impressively a number of different species have been demonstrated to have quite advanced 
aural pattern recognition abilities (e.g., cotton-top tamarins – Fitch & Hauser (2004); European 
starlings - Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash, & Nusbaum (2006). Yet none of the non-human animal 
communication systems are compositional (Kirby & Hurford, 2002) - that is – no non-human 
communication systems consist of signals where ‘the meaning of a signal is some function of the 
meaning of the parts of that signal and the way in which they are put together’ (p.128).  
 
Compositionality is a universal feature of all human languages and together with other universals they 
comprise these language properties that many linguists have long sought to explain. However, only 
recently the mainstream approach of linguistic enquiry changed from synchronic (e.g., Chomsky, 
1995) to diachronic and evolutionary
9
 (e.g., Bickerton, 1990; Croft, 2000; Kirby, in prep.; 2000; 2001; 
Wray, 1998; Tallerman 2007), thus leading to an explanation of compositionality. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly explain reasons for approaching language as a system 
that evolved during cultural transmission, rather than natural selection. Then, I will describe 
background findings in computer modelling that allowed researchers to explain some aspects of 
language acquisition and some language universals. All this background knowledge will lead us to the 
introduction of the Iterated Learning Model (henceforth, the ILM) and the explanation of 
compositionality. The literature reviewed in this chapter will help us to better contextualise the 
experiment by Matthews et al. (in prep.) that demonstrates the evolution of categorisation within the 
ILM and that constitutes a starting point of our current investigation. Matthews et al.’s study will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 in more detail. 
                                                          
9 One of the most frequently debated issues in evolutionary linguistics concerns the debate over characteristics of the first 
form of language, referred to as protolanguage (e.g., Bickerton, 1990; Tallerman, 2007; Wray, 1998). Although not without 
critique (e.g., Tallerman, 2007), Wray’s (1998) proposal of holistic protolanguage, which over evolutionary time changed 
into a compositional system, is in line with computer simulations (e.g., Kirby,2001) and experiments with human 





4.2 Natural selection versus cultural transmission  
In a seminal paper, Pinker & Bloom (1990) claimed that ‘the only way to explain the origin of such 
abilities as language is through the theory of natural selection’. This means that language and its 
structural properties should be treated on a par with such functional systems as, for example, the 
vertebrate eye that has biologically adapted to the requirements imposed by the environment that its 
bearers inhabit (Lamb, Collin, & Pugh, 2007). However, the idea that a quickly changing linguistic 
environment could allow for the evolution of language genes has been argued not to be a feasible 
scenario because natural selection needs a stable environment to engender genetic adaptations 
(Chater, Reali, & Christiansen, 2009; Christiansen & Chater, 2008).  
An alternative view of the evolution of structural properties of language assumes that they are 
products of cultural transmission (or cultural evolution). Arguably, the most important feature of this 
approach, that appears to be uniquely human (Price, Caldwell, & Whiten, 2010), is the cumulativeness 
of behaviours that result from cultural transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello, 1999). 
Cumulative culture is usually present in populations of social learners where ‘the accumulation of 
modifications over time result[s] in innovation that no individual could have discovered on his or her 
own’ (Price et al., 2010: 27). Therefore, cumulative culture results in behaviours that are much more 
adaptive than the ones acquired individually (Boyd & Richerson, 1996).  
In line with this thinking, Kirby & Hurford (2002) suggest that although biological evolution 
equipped humans with learning mechanisms needed to learn language, it was cultural evolution that 
led to the emergence of languages that exist today and their universal features.  
4.3 Emergent behaviour and language acquisition as the problem of 
induction 
A crucial step in computer modelling of language was the demonstration that linguistic rule-like 
behaviour can emerge as a result of a computer model’s learning, according to a certain learning 
algorithm. This meant that linguistic behaviour did not have to be explained by the postulation of 
some inherent explicit rules (such as, for example, those required by Chomsky's (e.g., 2002) concepts 
of the Language Acquisition Device (LAD) or Universal Grammar (UG)), predefining it before it 
actually emerged. In fact, it is true that emergent linguistic behaviours in computer models are 
constrained by the internal architecture of the model and the learning algorithm used, but nowhere in 
such models are there rules explicitly built into their architecture. 
For example, McClelland & Rumelhart (1986) demonstrated, using a simple pattern associator neural 
network, that the U-shaped acquisition profile of English past-tense forms can result from the 
network’s generalisations over the input data. Although their model has been heavily criticised for the 
lack of explanation of detailed linguistic facts of English past tense (Pinker & Prince, 1989), it 
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presents a significant step towards an understanding of linguistic behaviour as emergent - that is – 
learnt and cultural, rather than predetermined by the LAD or UG. 
Computer simulations also have helped to address another issue that has troubled linguists for 
decades, namely, the logical problem of language acquisition (or the poverty of stimulus argument). 
According to Chomsky, linguistic input that a child gets during language acquisition is ‘too 
impoverished to motivate the grammatical knowledge that adult speakers invariably possess’ 
(2002:7). Given this, the argument of the poverty of stimulus seems to motivate the postulation of UG 
which can supply innate grammatical properties lacking in linguistic input received by a child. 
However, in addition to theoretical arguments suggesting that no adequate empirical data has been 
supplied in favour of Chomsky’s formulation of the poverty of stimulus argument (Pullum & Scholz, 
2002), there is evidence from computer simulations and behavioural studies that impoverished 
learning data is required for language acquisition (e.g., Cornish, Tamariz, & Kirby, 2009; Kirby, in 
press.; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). 
Computer simulations see language learning as an induction problem  in which limited language data, 
constituting a transmission bottleneck, is unavoidable (e.g., Cornish, Tamariz, & Kirby, 2009; Kirby, 
in press.) and necessary for structured generalisation behaviour to occur (e.g., Elman, 1993; Kirby, 
2001; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). For example, using the ILM (to be 
explained shortly) Kirby & Hurford (2002) show that only when neural networks are trained on a 
medium sized set of  50 meaning-signal pairs, as opposed to a very small training set of 20 items and 
a very large training set of 2000 items, non-random structure emerges. 
Furthermore, as noted by Cornish (2010), a data bottleneck is not the only way of limiting language 
input during learning that can result in the emergence of structure. She emphasises that the most 
important factor is the presence of imperfect information, while its source is irrelevant.  Thus, for 
example, the limited data can come from the fact that children have limited memory and attention 
span (Elman, 1993 – simulation 3) or that human adult learners are not perfect learners – that is - even 
if they get access to the training data comprising the whole language, they cannot make a full use of 
the provided information due to the constraints imposed by their memory (Cornish, 2010). 
4.4 Language as an organism and an explanation of universals 
Another crucial step in modelling language learning was the demonstration that emergent linguistic 
behaviour adapts to the learner’s learning biases, such as for example, cognitive-general sequential 
learning biases (Christiansen & Ellefson, 2002; Christiansen, Kelly, Shillcock, & Greenfield, under 
review; Reali & Christiansen, 2009) or a bias against synonyms and homonyms (Smith, 2004). 
Furthermore, it was argued that some of such learning biases could be innate (Batali, 1998; Smith, 
2004). In light of these findings, it was suggested that language can be considered an organism which 
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adapts to pressures coming from its learning environment which is the human mind (Christiansen & 
Ellefson, 2002; Christiansen & Chater, 2008).  
An important contribution to the debate over universals are the findings demonstrating that particular 
linguistic universals can emerge as a result of language adapting to the learner’s learning biases. For 
example, Christiansen & Devlin (1997), training neural networks with the same internal architecture – 
hence - the same learning biases, demonstrated that recursively inconsistent languages were harder to 
learn than recursively consistent languages
10
 (cf. Christiansen, 2000 on similar findings with human 
participants).  This finding is interesting because recursively consistent structures are more common 
in the typological distribution of languages in the world (cf. Dryer, 1992) which suggests a largely 
universal word order preference for recursive consistency.  
4.5 Modelling language evolution via cultural transmission 
4.5.1 The Iterated Learning Model (the ILM) 
In previous sections we have seen that linguistic universals, even without modelling cultural 
evolutionary processes, can be conceived of as emergent adaptive behaviours which arise as a 
consequence of fitting into learning biases of the language learner. The leading theme of this section 
is the idea that if we model language evolution as the process of cultural transmission in the form of 
iterated learning (Kirby & Hurford, 2002), we can witness, under certain circumstances (e.g., given 
certain cognitive biases and certain sizes of the transmission bottleneck), the emergence of more 
learnable and more structured languages (Brighton, Smith, & Kirby, 2005; Cornish, 2010; Cornish, 
Tamariz, & Kirby, 2009; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008; Kirby, Smith, & Brighton, 2004). It is 
important to emphasise that the emergence of such a structure is by no means caused by intentions of 
artificial or human agents. 
The iterated learning is ‘a process whereby an individual acquires a behaviour by observing a similar 
behaviour in another individual who acquired it in the same way’ (Kirby et al. 2008: 10681) and has 
been successfully implemented in the Iterated Learning Model (cf. Mesoudi & Whiten, (2008), for a 
review of other models of cultural transmission).  
The ILM has been extensively used in computational modelling to model language evolution (e.g., 
Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby, 2001; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby, Smith, & Brighton, 2004; 
Smith, 2002; Smith, 2004). Recently, the ILM has been applied to humans to more realistically model 
learning biases of human cognition during language evolution (Kirby et al., 2008; Cornish et al., 
2009; Cornish, 2010, Matthews et al. in prep.). 
                                                          
10 Recursively consistent languages are such languages in which the head always precedes or follows the complement. 
Recursively inconsistent languages, on the other hand, are both head-initial and head-final. 
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Typically, the ILM comprises a population of individuals arranged into transmission chains. Each 
member (generation) of the chain has a task of learning an artificial language (the finite set of signal-
meaning pairs) and producing an output which serves as the input for the next generation. This cycle 
is repeated until the desired number of generations has been reached. The transmission of information 
in each chain mirrors the way information about language structure is transmitted via generalisation 
over evolutionary time-scale. 
4.5.2 Emergence of compositionality in the ILM 
We started this chapter with a goal of explaining compositionality – the unique feature of natural 
languages that has been recently described as one of the major transitions in language evolution 
(Kirby, in press). Now we will demonstrate the circumstance in which it emerges in the ILM. 
 Although compositionality emerges in a typical computer simulation using the ILM (e.g., Kirby et 
al., 2004), not all ILM studies with human participants demonstrate emerging compositionality. 
Instead, systematic underspecification with ambiguity (i.e., the use of same signals for different 
meanings) appears in some of the experiments (e.g., Experiment 1 in the study by Kirby et al., 2008; 
an experiment with participants’ memory acting as a bottleneck in the study by Cornish, 2010). Only 
when the learning set was filtered against homonyms did compositionality emerge (Kirby et al., 2008; 
Experiment 2). Kirby et al., (2008) suggest that, although the filtering was applied artificially, it can 
be assumed to model the communication pressure of expressivity (i.e., the pressure to express 
meanings only by means of one-to-one signal-to-meaning mappings, as opposed to one-to-many 
signal-to-meaning mappings). Furthermore, such an artificial filtering could be treated as an 
equivalent of an innate learning bias against homonymy that human learners seem to possess (cf. 
Smith, 2004).  
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Chapter 5 Current experiment  
5.1 Introduction 
The ILM methodology we have reviewed in Chapter 4 served as the basis for an experiment by 
Matthews et al. (in prep.) which in turn is a starting point for the current study. There were two main 
findings in Matthews et al.’s (in prep.) study that we would like to elaborate on here. Firstly, by 
modelling the evolution of categorisation using the ILM with human participants (cf. Kirby et al. 
2008), they demonstrated how category boundaries are gradually formed during learning in 
transmission chains. Starting with random category boundaries in a continuous meaning space, 
learners in transmission chains gradually reorganised them into structured categories. This was done 
with aid of language labels whose role was to (1) assemble physically similar shapes into similar 
categories by means of labelling them with similar or identical names, and to (2) separate physically 
different shapes into different categories by means of labelling them with different labels. 
Their second, arguably more exciting, finding was that some participants seemed to be using two 
different metrics of similarity during language learning.  According to one of the metrics, rotation
11
 
was a relevant factor in categorisation, whereas according to the other it was not. In other words, 
according to the metric in which rotation mattered, a rotated and an unrotated shape would be 
considered very different and thus would be given different labels. By contrast, according to the 
metric where rotation was irrelevant, each of these shapes would be considered similar or identical 
and thus would be labelled similarly or identically.  
Given Matthews et al.’s (in prep.) finding that categorisation systems that evolved in final generations 
in all four transmission chains had qualitatively different category boundaries, we predict that 
perception of the meaning space also differed across  languages in which these categorisation systems 
evolved.  
This prediction is supported by an abundance of findings demonstrating that cross-linguistic 
differences in labels used in colour, shape, and other domains can result in cross-linguistic differences 
in perception of stimuli within and across category boundaries that these labels demarcate (cf. Chapter 
2). Note that comparing a number of qualitatively different languages evolved in Matthews et al.’s 
study with respect to perception of stimuli in the same meaning space is analogue to comparing a 
number of different real natural languages with respect to perception of a meaning space that is 
identical for all of them – for example – a meaning space in the domain of colour (cf. §2.3.1). 
Furthermore, such investigations are akin to testing linguistic relativity suggesting that our perception 
is influenced by the language we speak (cf. §2.3 on a debate over linguistic relativity). 
                                                          
11 ‘Rotation’ is used here, following Matthews et al.’s terminology as shorthand for ‘rotation and reflection’. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, categorical perception (CP) is the mechanism that allows us to represent 
our continuous environment as discrete ‘chunks’ – categories. This is possible because CP shapes 
representations of categories in such a way that it diminishes within-category differences and 
increases between-category differences. 
There is strong evidence that CP effects (i.e. within-category compression and between-category 
expansion) are very flexible and undergo developmental changes (cf. §2.4), as well as that they can be 
artificially induced during categorisation learning in experiments (see §2.5). Given this, we assume 
that, in Matthews et al.’s study, learning category labels from the output of the previous generation 
induced CP effects with respect to learnt category boundaries in the learning generation. Furthermore, 
we assume that the CP effects induced during language transmission were different across languages 
that evolved in Matthews et al.’s study. 
In light of these assumptions as well as the evidence reviewed in Chapter 2, measuring CP effects 
seems an ideal way of tapping into differences in perception of the meaning space across the evolved 
languages (i.e., categorisation systems). 
There is one apparent problem with respect to testing the prediction that learning different labels that 
evolved in the categorisation systems in Matthews et al.’s study resulted in differences in perception 
of categories in the meaning space that these labels referred to. The issue is that Matthews et al.’s 
experiment was not designed to collect data about perception.  
We addressed this problem by taking new participants who learned two of the languages that evolved 
in Matthews et al.’s experiment and assume that the new participants replace given generations of 
learners in Matthews et al.’s study. This assumption will allow us to maintain continuity with given 
transmission chains in their experiment. It is important, however, to replicate the same learning 
procedures as in Matthews et al.’s experiment so that our replacing generations learn their languages 
in exactly the same way as their counterparts in Matthews et al.’s study. Once this is done, our 
prediction can be tested by getting the new replacement generations to do a similarity judgement task 
on pairs of shapes from the meaning space used in Matthews et al.’s study. 
Due to time limits, only two languages evolved in Matthews et al.’s experiment were replaced (cf. 
Stimuli for Language Training and Testing Regimen for a choice justification):  
 L1 that replaced the language evolved in Chain 3 in Generation 10 
 L2 that replaced the language that evolved in Chain 4 in Generation 10 





We hypothesise that two shapes in stimuli pairs that 
  have been labelled identically in L1 (i.e., categorised into one category) will be perceived 
as more similar than two shapes in the same stimuli pairs that have been labelled 
differently in L2 (i.e., categorised into two categories); and that shapes in stimuli pairs 
that 
  have been labelled differently in L1 will be perceived more dissimilar than two shapes in 
the same stimuli pairs that have been labelled identically in L2.   
In other words, we hypothesise that learning two different category systems as represented by L1 and 
L2 will induce opposite CP effects with respect to the same stimuli pairs. Due to within-category 
compression and between-category expansion, pairs of shapes labelled identically in L1 will be 
perceived as more similar than the same pairs of shapes labelled differently in L2, and vice versa. 
Our second hypothesis concerns the rotation aspect of languages evolved by Matthews et al. (in 
prep.). We predict that two metrics of similarity – that is – one that considers rotation relevant and the 
other that does not – will be very influential with respect to perception of the meaning space, 
specifically, rotated and unrotated shapes. 
Furthermore, we predict that, after learning L1 and L2, the influence of each of the two metrics on 
perception of the meaning space will be such that it will be possible to capture it in a task where 
stimuli are not organised according to specific category boundaries as dictated by language labels 
present in learning data. 
The concrete formulation of Hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 
Participants learning L1 for which rotation is relevant (i.e., in L1, most rotated and unrotated 
shapes are named differently) will find rotated shapes less similar than participants learning L2 
for which rotation is irrelevant (i.e., in L2, most rotated and unrotated shapes are named 
identically or similarly). 
Apart from evidence supporting linguistic relativity and demonstrating the influence of linguistic 
development and artificial category learning on perception and CP (cf. Chapter 2 for a review), our 
experimental investigation has one more, perhaps the most exciting, motivation. L1 and L2 are the 
languages that evolved during language evolution by cultural transmission. If we are able to observe a 
significant difference between perceived similarities of items in the meaning space as a result of 
learning these two languages, then we can support an idea that two qualitatively different semantic 
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systems can evolve during language transmission. Although this finding would be in line with other 
findings demonstrating co-evolution of language structure with semantics (e.g., Kirby et al. 2008; 
Matthews et al. in prep.), the current study would be to our knowledge the first to demonstrate the 
evolution of semantics by means of directly measuring changes in perception. Furthermore, our 
finding would also be the first to demonstrate that language evolution can introduce different metrics 
of similarity into the human conceptual system. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Brief description 
27 English-native speakers were recruited from the University of Edinburgh to participate in a study 
where they had to learn an ‘alien language’ and perform a similarity judgement task. Participants had 
no linguistic background at a higher-education level and had never taken part in an ‘alien language’ 
learning experiment before. The age mean was 21.56 years; the minimum age was 17 and the 
maximum 28. The female to male ratio was 17:10. The experiment was designed using E-prime 
software and it was performed in sound absorbent booths equipped with a PC. 
5.2.2 Stimuli for the Language Training and Testing Regimen  
The stimuli in language training and testing regimen were two languages, consisting of 20 meaning-
signal pairs, that evolved in final generations (i.e., Generation 10) in two different transmission chains 
(Chain 3 and Chain 4) in the study by Matthews et al. (in prep.). We refer to these languages as L1 
(i.e., Chain 3 Generation 10) and L2 (i.e., Chain 4 Generation 10). In what follows motivations for the 
choice of L1 and L2 are supplied, as well as all the relevant technical details with respect to them. 
Continuous-meaning space 
In the study by Matthews et al. (in prep.) the meanings of all languages, including L1 and L2, come 
from a continuous 100-element two-dimensional meaning space (Fig.1).  Matthews et al. used this 
kind of meaning space, rather than discrete meanings (e.g., Kirby et al., 2008; cf. § 4.5.1), in order to 
more accurately model the environment that a language learner categorises with aid of language 
labels.   
In the meaning space each image varies in height, length, shape and rotation. In two opposite corners 
of the meaning space, there are a rectangle and a rectangle that is a 90° rotation of it, whereas in the 
other two there are an equilateral triangle and a triangle that is a 90° rotation of it. The remaining 
images in the meaning space were morphed from the images in each corner, depending on distance 




Fig.1 The full 100-element meaning space from which meanings in L1 and L2 come. Reprinted with permission from 
Matthews et al. (in prep.). 
Transmission chains 
There were 4 transmission chains in Matthews et al.’s study, each consisting of 10 generations of 
learners (each generation was represented by a single participant). All generations learned a language 
consisting of 20 signal-meaning pairs. The first generation in each chain learned a random language, 
consisting of 20 signals (strings between 2 and 4 syllables that were randomly concatenated out of 9 
syllables) that were randomly assigned to 20 meanings, randomly chosen from the 100-element 
continuous meaning space. All remaining generations learned a language that was the previous 
participant’s output in the final test. 
Motivations of the choice of L1 and L2 
Experimental procedure in Matthews et al.’s (in prep.) experiment consisted of three rounds of 
training (cf. Language Training and Testing Regimen below for a detailed description) and a final test. 
The final test comprised 10 Seen items (the meanings that participants had already seen during 
training) and 10 Unseen items (the meanings that participants had not seen during training), and the 
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set of 16 fixed items. The set of 16 fixed items consisted of shapes that were evenly distributed in the 
meaning space (see Fig. 2).The set was the same for all participants, thus constituting a good sample 
for obtaining relevant measurements that could be compared across generations in Matthews et al.’s 
study. 
The stimuli used in the current experiment (i.e., meaning-signal pairs comprising L1 and L2) were 
obtained from the final test in Generation 10, in both Chain 3 and Chain 4 in Matthews et al.’s 
experiment. However, L1 and L2 only comprised 10 Seen and 10 Unseen items, without the fixed set. 
The choice of 20 items from the final test, instead of, for example, 20 items from earlier tests during 3 
rounds of training, is motivated by the fact that the former were the language stimuli serving as the 
input for the next learning generation in Matthews et al.’s study. Furthermore, the 20 items from the 
final test are the most advanced form of an evolved language in Matthews et al.’s experiment because 
they reflect how some language items were memorised (Seen items) and how some were generalised 
and/or innovated (Unseen items) after the same amount of exposure to training data. Therefore, the 20 
items from the final test could be claimed to model the result of learning processes usually involved in 
language evolution in the ILM.  
Using categorisations of the set of 16 fixed items, Matthews et al. (in prep.) calculated language 
structure for each generation in all 4 chains. 
A language is structured if shapes which are close to each other in the meaning space have similar (or 
identical) names and shapes which are far away from each other have different names. In order to 
establish name similarity and shape distance Matthews et al. used two measures: the Levenstein 
Distance (LD)
12
 and the Euclidean Distance (ED), respectively. If these two measures, calculated for 
the set of 16 items, are positively correlated, then the language can be thought of as structured. A 
distribution of correlation values for Monte-Carlo permutations of signal-meaning pairs of the fixed 
set was used to obtain the statistical significance of the language structure measurement. The 
approach to structure measurement used by Matthews et al. is known as the Mantel test.  
The choice of L1 and L2 for the current study was based on the significance of structure measures 
calculated in Matthews et al.’s study. This was motivated by the fact that significant measures of 
structure guarantee that L1 and L2 are substantially clustered (i.e., structured), thus maximising our 
chances of obtaining meaningful data in the similarity judgement task. 
Apart from Matthews et al.’s finding that evolved languages became gradually more structured by 
means of categorisation, the authors also found that rotation was a relevant dimension for 
categorisations in final generations. They found that in some languages (R-languages) two shapes 
                                                          
12 Levenstein distance (or edit distance) (Levenstein, 1966) is calculated as the number of edit operations (insertions, 
deletions, or substitutions) needed to be performed to transform one string to another. 
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which were rotated and reflected were named identically (i.e., categorised into one category) or very 
similarly (i.e., categorised into similar categories), whereas in other languages (NR-languages) they 
were named differently (i.e., categorised into two different categories) (cf. Fig. 3).  
In order to take into account the differences with respect to rotation when calculating language 
structure, Matthews et al. used two different measures of shape distance – that is – two different EDs. 
Given this, they obtained two different measures of structure: 
 Non-rotational (NR) Structure, for which rotated and reflected shapes are named differently, 
was calculated using ED1: 
 
 Rotational (R) Structure, for which they are named the same or very similarly, was calculated 
using ED2:  
 
Our second hypothesis concerns testing whether perception of rotated and reflected shapes is different 
in participants who learnt two languages that use different similarity metrics regarding rotation 
differently. Therefore, in our search of L1 and L2 we are determined to find two languages that differ 
the most with respect to how they categorise rotational shapes. This implies that L1 should have the 
highest significance of NR-structure, and a non-significant R-structure, whereas L2 should have the 
highest significance of R-structure, and a non-significant NR-structure. Accordingly, the choice was 
made for L1 to have NR-structure
13
 = 4.43, R-structure = 0.01; and for L2 to have R-structure = 6.18, 








                                                          










Fig.2 The set of 16 fixed items (left). The position of fixed items in the meaning space marked with a circle. Reprinted with 
permission from Matthews et al. (in prep.). 
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Fig.3 An example of a shape pair containing an unrotated (left) and 
rotated shape (right). In R-languages such shapes were named 
identically or similarly, whereas in NR-languages they were named 




5.2.3 Stimuli in the Similarity Judgement Task 
The stimuli in the similarity judgement task consisted of 80 pairs of shapes from the 100-element 
meaning space used in Matthews et al.’s experiment (see Appendix C for the full list of stimuli). 
Although there were 4950 possible combinations of shapes in a pair, we limited the number of stimuli 
pairs that we used to 80. This limit was enforced to ensure that participants remained focused for the 
duration of the experiment, thus preventing random decisions about shape similarity. 
The 80 pairs can be divided into 2 sets of data (56-pair and 24-pair sets) based on how they were 
analysed. The 56-pair set was used in the data analysis concerning Hypothesis 1, whereas the 24-pair 
set was used in the analysis concerning Hypothesis 2. 
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Stimuli for testing Hypothesis 1 
The set of 56 shape pairs consisted of 28 horizontal and vertical and 28 diagonal pairs (cf. Fig. 4).  In 
order to be chosen from the meaning space, all shape pairs in this set had to meet the following 
criteria: 
 ED1 between shapes in each pair should be equal to ED2 (criterion 1) 
 Both ED1 and ED2 should be approximately equal for all types of pairs (i.e. horizontal, 
vertical and diagonal) (criterion 2) 
 Stimuli pairs should consist of two types of pairs: 
o pairs in which both shapes should be labelled identically in L1 and differently in L2 
(i.e., both shapes in a pair should belong to the Same category in L1, henceforth S 
pairs, and to Different categories in L2, henceforth D pairs); we refer to such stimuli 
pairs as SD pairs;  
o pairs in which both shapes should be labelled differently in L1 and  identically in L2; 
we refer to such stimuli pairs as DS (criterion 3) 
 The number of SD pairs and DS pairs should be the same; this means that the number of S 
pairs and D pairs in each language (i.e., L1 and L2) should be the same (criterion 4) 
The Euclidean distances, ED1 and ED2, were 3 for horizontal and vertical pairs and 2.8 for diagonal 
pairs which makes both types of distances approximately equal across all three types of pairs.  
Although we realise that equal Euclidean distances do not correspond to equal psychological distances 
(i.e. equal discriminability), we took into account Criteria 1 and 2 in order to attempt to lessen 
variability with respect to psychological similarity between the stimuli. However, the maintenance of 
equal Euclidean distances within pairs of stimuli was not strictly necessary because label learning 
effects on perceived similarity of shape pairs in L1 were assessed by means of comparing them to 
parallel effects on perceived similarity of exactly the same pairs in L2. In other words, 
discriminability differences between pairs of stimuli should not confound our measurements as long 
as they influence perceived similarity in both L1 and L2 equally. 
Our aim is to examine the hypothesis that perceived similarity of two shapes within a pair that have 
been categorised into one category in L1 is larger than perceived similarity of the same shapes that 
have been categorised into two categories in L2 and vice versa.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we required that each shape in each stimuli pair be categorised 
according to criteria 3 and 4. Ideally this categorisation (i.e., labels for each shape) would come from 
learners after they have trained on L1 and L2. This suggests that stimuli for the similarity judgement 
task should come from the final test on the set of 16 fixed items performed by each participant in our 
study (cf. Motivation of the choice of L1 and L2 for more details of what the set of 16 fixed items was; 
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and Language Training and Testing Regimen for details of experimental procedures). However, cross-
participant variation with respect to categorisation of the same items in the set would make it 
extremely difficult to deduce a uniform way of categorisation of the fixed set. 
The problem of cross-participant variation was resolved by means of using categories that a perfect 
learner would generate after learning L1 and L2
14
 (see Appendix A for the full list of categorisations 
made by a perfect learner). A perfect learner simulated here remembers every signal-meaning pair it 
has seen and then labels a novel meaning (i.e., a shape) with the name given to the nearest meaning it 
has learnt. This type of learner is an example of a ‘k-nearest neighbour classifier’ with k=1, where ‘k’ 
is the number of nearest seen items that are considered when deciding how to categorise novel 
meanings.  
Using categorisations of a perfect learner we are no longer confined by the necessity of using the set 
of 16 fixed items as the source of categories. Instead, 100 labels were generated for each shape in the 
100-element meaning space by simulating a perfect learner. This allowed us to choose the 56 pairs of 
stimuli from the 100-element meaning space, keeping criteria 1-4 in mind. 
The issue of the equal number of SD pairs and DS pairs (criterion 4), was resolved in the following 
way. Firstly, all horizontal and vertical pairs with ED1=ED2=3 and diagonal pairs with 
ED1=ED2=2.8 were collected from the meaning space. Then the number of SD and DS pairs was 
calculated for the horizontal and vertical group and for the diagonal group. The number of DS pairs in 
the horizontal and vertical group was 14. However, because the number of SD pairs in the horizontal 
and vertical group and the number of SD and DS pairs in the diagonal group exceeded 14 we 
randomly chose 14 pairs of each relevant pair type. As a result there were 14 SD and 14 DS pairs in 
the horizontal and vertical group and 14 SD and 14 DS pairs in the diagonal group.  
                                                          




Fig.4 Examples of stimuli pairs used in the similarity judgement task to test Hypothesis 1. Horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
pairs are indicated by blue, green, and orange arrows respectively. 
Stimuli for testing Hypothesis 2 
The set of 24 shape pairs exclusively consisted of pairs in which one shape was a rotation of the other 
(cf. Fig.5). In other words, we chose pairs of shapes for which ED1 was as high as possible and 
ED2=0. 
This choice of the 24 pair shapes enables us to focus on the perceived similarity of pairs of shapes that 
differ solely along the dimension of rotation, thus comprising an ideal set for testing Hypothesis 2. 
It is also worth noting that for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 2, we did not have to organise the 
stimuli in each pair into categories as we did with the stimuli for Hypothesis 1. This is because we 
expected that we would observe the influence of both similarity metrics (the one that causes 
participants to consider rotation relevant and the one that does not) regardless of how categorical 









The experimental procedure consisted of three rounds of language training, with two minute breaks 
between each round, a similarity judgement task, and a final language test (cf. Appendix B for 
experimental instructions). Apart from the similarity judgement task, all parts of the experimental 
procedure were adapted from Matthews et al.’s (in prep) experimental procedure
15
. 
 Language Training and Testing Regimen 
                                                          
15  The code for language learning and training tasks was kindly provided by Cristina Matthews. The code for the similarity 
judgement task was prepared by the author. 
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Participants were randomly divided into two groups – one trained on L1 (14 participants) and another 
trained on L2 (13 participants). In the first two training rounds participants were exposed to 20 
randomly ordered signal-meaning pairs (comprising all the L1 or L2, depending on the condition) and 
were tested on 10 out of 20 randomly chosen meanings for which they had to supply signals. In the 
third training round the training procedure was the same, but there was no testing. After all the three 
rounds of training participants performed the similarity judgement task and the final test on the set of 
16 fixed items from the study by Matthew’s et al. (in prep.).  
The role of the final test was to produce a metric for measuring accuracy of all participants (cf. 
§5.3.3).  
Similarity Judgement Task 
Participants in both groups (L1 and L2) judged similarity of 80 pairs of shapes that were chosen 
according to the criteria explained in §5.2.3. After the final round of language training participants 
were instructed on the computer screen that they would be asked to judge the similarity of pairs of 
shapes. During each trial a pair of shapes appeared on the computer screen. Both shapes in each pair 
were positioned side by side and appeared on the computer screen simultaneously for 2,500 ms. The 
simultaneous, as opposed to consecutive, appearance of both shapes was chosen because it has 
previously succeeded at being a reliable method demonstrating CP effects in normal and language-
impaired participants (e.g., Roberson, Davidoff, & Braisby, 1999). Furthermore, if two shapes appear 
simultaneously, short-term memory is burdened less than when they appear consecutively.  
After each pair had disappeared, participants marked, on the similarity judgement sheet provided, the 
similarity of the pair they had just seen. In each similarity judgement sheet there were 5 lines per 
page, comprising together 80 lines. Each line was 12 centimetres long with the beginning and end 
points marked as ‘not similar’ and ‘very similar’ respectively. Such a line enables continuous 
measurements. All participants judged the similarity of each of 80 pairs and the order of appearance 
of all the pairs was randomised and different for each participant. 
After completion of the experiment, each similarity judgement was measured by the experimenter and 
rescaled such that the markings at the end points were 1 (‘not similar’) and 7 (‘very similar’). The 
rescaling was done in order to obtain measurements with numbers of magnitude parallel to that used 
in 7-point Likert scales.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted in order to compare similarity ratings of shape pairs where 
both shapes in a pair were labelled identically in L1 and L2 (Same condition) with similarity ratings 
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of matched shape pairs where both shapes in a pair were labelled differently in L1 and L2 (Different 
condition). There was no significant difference between Same (M=3.797, SD=0.86) and Different 
(M=3.810, SD=0.9) conditions; t(55)=-0.28, p=0.78.  
This result demonstrates that there was no difference between perceived similarity of shapes in pairs 
where both shapes were in one category in L1 and in two categories in L2, as well as of shapes in 
pairs where both shapes were in two categories in L1 and one category in L2. This further means that 
our hypothesis that similarity ratings in Same condition would be higher than in Different condition is 
unsupported.  
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Another paired-samples t-test was performed in order to compare, between conditions L1 and L2, 
similarity ratings of 24 shape pairs, where one shape in a pair was a rotation of the other. It was 
hypothesised that similarity ratings will be higher in condition L2 than in condition L1 because 
participants learning L2 were exposed to a considerable number of signal-meaning pairs for which 
rotation was irrelevant (i.e., two shapes varying in rotation were labelled similarly or identically), as 
opposed to participants learning L1 who were exposed to a considerable amount of signal-meaning 
pairs for which rotation was relevant (i.e., two shapes varying in rotation were labelled differently). 
We found a significant difference between condition L1 (M=5.13, SD=0.4) and condition L2 
(M=5.61, SD=0.6); t(23)=-3.41, p=0.002. 
This finding suggests that participants learning L1, for which rotation was relevant, found shape pairs, 
in which one shape was a rotation of the other, perceptually different than participants learning L2, for 
which rotation was irrelevant. Furthermore, our hypothesis that similarity ratings in L1 would be 
significantly lower than in L2 has been supported (M of L1 < M of L2). 
5.3.3 Post-hoc analysis 
A post-hoc analysis was performed with respect to testing Hypothesis 1 in order to remove possible 
outliers. We assumed that similarity ratings could be influenced by how well participants had learnt 
the languages. In order to investigate this we measured participants’ accuracy in categorisation after 
learning. Given this, outliers were defined as those learners who did not categorise the set of 16 fixed 
items in the final test sufficiently accurately. Accuracy scores were established by means of 
calculating the number of participants’ labels (categories) given to shapes in the fixed set that were 
identical to the labels given to the same shapes by the perfect learner. 
9 participants in each group (i.e., L1 and L2) with the highest accuracy scores were chosen for a post-
hoc statistical analysis. In other words, participants with scores lower than 8/16 in L1 and 4/16 in L2 
were excluded as outliers. 
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A paired-samples t-test was performed as the post-hoc statistical analysis to compare similarity ratings 
between Same and Different conditions (cf. the § on the results for Hypothesis 1 for more details on 
the conditions). There was no significant difference between the conditions (Same: M=3.93, SD=0.83; 
Different: M=3.89, SD=0.86); t(55)=0.57, p=0.57. 
The result of the post-hoc statistical analysis demonstrates that even after the removal of outliers there 




Chapter 6 Discussion 
6.1 Hypothesis 1 
6.1.1 Design issues 
We hypothesised that perceived similarity of shapes in pairs that were categorised identically in L1 
and L2 (Same condition) would be higher than perceived similarity of matched shapes in pairs that 
were categorised differently in these languages (Different condition). Our hypothesis was motivated 
by findings supporting the Whorf hypothesis that speaking languages which differ in how they 
categorise the meaning space results in differences in perception of this space (cf. Chapter 2 for a 
review). Therefore, we expected that learning L1 and L2, which differ in how they categorise the 
meaning space, would result in within-category expansion and between-category compression of 
perceived similarity. It is worth noting that it is a common practice in psychological literature (cf. 
Chapter 2) to test linguistic relativity by means of measuring CP effects. 
Our result failed to demonstrate a difference in perceived similarity between Same and Different 
conditions. This could be interpreted as indicating that the effect of language learning (i.e., training) 
was not strong enough to influence and change perceived similarity of the stimuli. In other words, it is 
possible that there was too little language training in the current experiment. Such an interpretation is 
motivated by an observation that in other studies, that successfully demonstrate changes in perceived 
similarity of stimuli as a result of assigning categories to the stimuli, there is substantially more 
training. 
 For example, in Goldstone’s (1994a; Experiment 2) study demonstrating that perception of size and 
brightness changes as a result of assigning two categories to stimuli characterised by these 
dimensions,  participants are exposed to 20 repetitions of all 16 stimuli (i.e., object-category pairs) 
during training. In another study investigating how categorisation learning changes perceived 
similarities between faces (Goldstone et al.,  2001) each stimulus was presented 54 times. By contrast, 
training in our experiment comprised only 3 learning rounds, hence each training stimulus was 
presented only 3 times.  
Another factor that could have contributed to the finding that no reliable difference was present in 
perceived similarity between Same and Different conditions could be the fact that no feedback was 
supplied during training in the current experiment. Although unsupervised learning (i.e., without 
feedback) is involved when we learn our native language, supervised learning (i.e., with feedback) is 
typically more successful when it comes to demonstrating CP effects as a result of artificial category 
learning (e.g., Goldstone, 1994a; Goldstone et al., 2001). Therefore, supplying feedback to 
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participants during language training could have potentially resulted in better learning of L1 and L2, 
and, as a consequence, it could improve our result.   
Another problem that could have contributed to the non-significant result we obtained concerns the 
fact that, in a typical study designed to investigate changes in perceived similarity as a result of 
category learning, participants are trained on exactly the same number of stimuli that are subsequently 
used in the similarity judgement task (e.g., Goldstone, 1994a; Goldstone et al., 2001). In the current 
experiment this was not the case. 
We assumed that training on only a subset of the stimuli subsequently used in the similarity 
judgement task (i.e., 13/112 for L1 and 14/112 for L2
16
) would be enough to influence participants’ 
perception of the inexperienced elements in the meaning space. Furthermore, we assumed that, 
because the stimuli used in the similarity judgement task lay within category boundaries that were to 
be identified during training, it would be possible for participants in the similarity judgement task to 
generalise over similarities of shapes they did not see during category learning.  
However, it is possible that the subset of the stimuli used in the similarity judgement task, that 
participants were trained on, could contain too few category exemplars. The implication of this 
possibility is that, with such a limited number of training exemplars, participants could develop 
category representations that were too weak to enable them to induce similarity of shape pairs they 
had not experienced during training. 
It is worth emphasising that all the problems mentioned so far (i.e., too little training, no feedback 
during training and the lack of identity of stimuli used during training and the similarity judgement 
task) are a consequence of a trade-off between a desire to maintain continuity with Matthews et al.’s 
(in prep.) experiment and a desire to design an experiment that would investigate the influence of 
learning two different languages on perception. Maintaining continuity was crucial since we set out to 
investigate the idea that language evolution, as modelled in their study, can lead to the emergence of 
two qualitatively different semantic systems. 
Furthermore, we need to bear in mind that, although the limited training could have indeed 
contributed to the non-significant result in the current experiment, the training was sufficient in 
Matthew’s et al. experiment to result in the evolution of categorisation. The reason for this could be 
that the alteration of perception may take place at a more deeply embedded level of processing, thus 
requiring more training to be effective. On the other hand, the evolution of categorisation without any 
changes in perception could take place at a level that requires less training. 
                                                          
16 Because L1 and L2 are from Matthews et al.’s study, we did not have any influence on neither the number of signal-
meaning pairs in them (there were 20), nor what they were. Thus, the fact that only 13 items from L1 and 14 from L2 were 
present in the set of stimuli for testing Hypothesis 1 in the similarity judgement task was beyond our control.    
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6.1.2 A perfect learner problem 
The choice of the perfect learner as the source of category labels used to generate Same/Different 
stimuli to test Hypothesis 1 (cf. Stimuli for Testing Hypothesis 1) may have also influenced our result. 
The perfect learner helped us to eliminate the problem of cross-participant variation (cf. Stimuli for 
Testing Hypothesis 1). Nevertheless, the results of the accuracy test conducted for the post-hoc 
analysis demonstrate that participants’ performance in labelling categories in the set of 16 fixed items, 
measured relative to the performance of the perfect learner, was not very good, with the highest scores 
of 12/16 for L1 and 8/16 for L2 and the lowest scores of 3/16 for L1 and 2/16 in L2 (cf. Fig. 6a-b)
17
. 
Such a low level of accuracy could indicate that participants did not learn the languages very well and 
as a consequence they did not form category representations strong enough to drive differences in 
perceived similarity of stimuli between L1 and L2.  
However, such a low level of accuracy could also suggest that the perfect learner’s performance was 
too rigid a reference point for participants’ performance because human learners are far from perfect 
learners. Therefore, it could be possible that the categories to test Hypothesis 1 might have been 
wrongly chosen. This could have resulted in a mismatch between categories that were formed in 
participants’ heads during training and the categories obtained from the perfect learner that they were 
tested on. As a consequence, we obtained a non-significant result and, possibly wrongly, interpreted it 
as indicative of weak learning performance. 
 
Figure 6a: Accuracy of categorisation of the set of 16 fixed items by participants learning L1 measured by the 
number of items that a participant labelled identically as the perfect learner. 
                                                          
17For simplicity, we adopted a simple accuracy test which does not take into account differences in Levenstein distances 
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Figure 6b: Accuracy of categorisation of the set of 16 fixed items by participants learning L2 measured by the 
number of items that a participant labelled identically as the perfect learner. 
6.2 Hypothesis 2 
Our second hypothesis that learning languages that use two different metrics of similarity, one, for 
which rotation is relevant (L1) and another, for which it is not (L2), would result in differential 
perception of rotated and unrotated stimuli has been found to be supported by the experimental data.  
Furthermore, the perceived similarity of stimuli pairs in which one shape is a rotation of the other was 
found to be higher in L2 than in L1, as we predicted. 
Given our result, it seems clear that the difference in perception of rotation between L1 and L2 was 
caused by learning stimuli that consisted of rotated and unrotated shapes labelled differently in L1 and 
similarly or identically in L2. Furthermore, we can conclude that our result is robust because the 
difference in perception of rotation between the languages was observed despite different category 
boundaries in each language (i.e., despite Different/Same categorisations made by the perfect learner, 
as discussed earlier).   
Upon a closer examination of training stimuli in L1, we can observe that, although most stimuli 
consist of rotated and unrotated shapes that are labelled differently (e.g., orange and light green 
shapes and yellow and light green shapes in Fig.7), there are some rotated and unrotated shapes (i.e., 
dark green shapes in Fig.7) that are contradicting the language’s general tendency because they are 
labelled identically. However, our result demonstrates that despite these counterexamples in L1 
training data, the influence of L1 on perception of rotation is still detectable. By contrast, in L2 there 
are no counterexamples to the language’s tendency to name rotated and unrotated shapes identically 
or similarly (e.g., cf. Fig.8 where all yellow, orange and red shapes are named similarly and all black, 
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In the context of our results that differ with respect to Hypothesis 1 and 2, it seems relevant to attempt 
to answer the question of why Hypothesis 2 has been supported, whereas Hypothesis 1 has not. 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that the influence of L1 and L2 on perception of rotated and unrotated 
shapes was so robust that it was uncovered despite all the issues that constrain the possibility of 
finding support for Hypothesis 1. In other words, such problematic issues as limited training, no 
feedback during training and the lack of identity of stimuli used during training and in the similarity 
judgement task do not seem to play a role with respect to testing Hypothesis 2 at all (See Design 
Issues for a discussion of these issues with respect to Hypothesis 1). Why is it the case that the 
influence of L1 and L2 on perception of rotation is so strong, whereas the influence of L1 and L2 on 
perception of within-category and between-category stimuli is not? 
The answer to this question we suggest is related to the nature of mechanisms involved in category 
learning and to the fact that learning in the experiment was restricted. It seems that in such a case 
there needs to be a perceptually salient feature in training stimuli that would facilitate category 
learning. This would imply that such a feature could be quickly picked up by perceptual learning 
mechanisms and easily emphasised or de-emphasised by association with language labels during 
training.  
Category learning involves mechanisms whereby relevant perceptual features are emphasised or de-
emphasised by respective assignment of identical or different labels to stimuli containing them. In 
circumstances where training is long (cf. § 6.1.1 for examples), category learning probably does not 
need to be aided by presence of a salient perceptual dimension because there is enough training to 
enable formation of more complex statistical relations between perceptual features of training stimuli 
and labels assigned to them. However, in a situation where training is limited, as in our experiment, 
only a feature that is perceptually salient can be picked up by language labels during training. In the 
current experiment rotation is such a salient perceptual feature. 
Perceptual salience of rotation is motivated by the fact that orientation, crucial for representation of 
rotations, is one of the first perceptual dimensions to be processed in the primary visual cortex (Hubel 
& Wiesel, 1962; Paradiso, 2002)
18
. 
In light of the above considerations, it is possible that rotation was the only perceptually salient 
stimuli feature that could be associated with language labels during training. As a consequence, 
category learning was facilitated and successful, and rotation was recognised as perceptually salient 
again when Hypothesis 2 was tested in the similarity judgement task.  
                                                          
18 Hubel and Wiesel (1962) discovered orientation-sensitive cells in the cat visual cortex. Paradiso (2002) reviews results 




Furthermore, it is possible that there was not enough training to enable participants to recognise any 
other perceptual features, less distinctive than rotation, that could facilitate category learning. As a 
result, participants were unable to successfully learn categorisation and gave random similarity ratings 
to the stimuli for testing Hypothesis 1 in the similarity judgement task. 
 
 
Fig.7 Shapes from L1 training. Coloured squares indicate identical labels (orange - nikihe; light green – pani; yellow – 
nikihehe; dark green – mani). Blue lines demarcate counterexamples to the language’s general tendency to consider rotation 























Fig.8 Shapes from L2 training. Coloured squares indicate identical labels (dark blue – mauhihi; light blue – maukihi;  very 
light blue – maukiki; orange – maumauage; yellow – maumage; maumag – red; hihi – black). 
 
6.3 General problems 
6.3.1 Conceptual processing confound 
In the current experiment we were interested in the influence of L1 and L2 learning on perceived 
similarity of the meaning space. However, similarity ratings used to measure perceived similarity in 
the current experiment are prone to reflecting conceptual (i.e., high-level), rather than perceptual (i.e., 
low-level) processing (Goldstone, 1994b; Goldstone et al., 2001). For example, similarity ratings can 
reflect factors, such as, goals and intentions of the comparison maker and the comparison maker’s 
expertise in dealing with geometrical figures due to her field of study or job (Goldstone, 1994b), as 
well as the strategic use of  language labels (Goldstone et al., 2001). In the current study, the strategic 




















The questionnaire was conducted immediately after participants completed the experiment. They were 
enquired about criteria they took into account when rating similarities of shape pairs in the similarity 
judgement task. More specifically, they were asked whether they considered geometrical properties of 
shapes in the task at hand or labels of shapes learnt during training when they rated similarity of 
stimuli. To enable participants to understand what was meant by ‘consideration of labels learnt during 
training’, they were given an example of a thought they could have: ‘I will give these two shapes a 
high similarity rating because just a moment ago I labelled them using the same name’. 
Although most shapes used in the similarity judgement task were not included in the training part of 
the experiment, they were within boundaries of categories to be learnt during training. Thus, we 
assume that due to this closeness to learnt category boundaries, participants could still consciously 
take into account labels of the learnt stimuli when judging similarity of the unseen stimuli. 
The questionnaire results demonstrate that 13/27 participants consciously thought in at least 50% of 
cases about language labels when judging similarity of shape pairs. On the other hand, 22/27 
participants consciously thought about geometrical properties in at least 50% of cases. 
Although we did not find any significant difference between L1 and L2 with respect to similarity 
ratings of Same/Different shape pairs in the current experiment (Hypothesis 1), it seems relevant to 
bear in mind the strategic use of linguistic category labels as a possible confound in future 
experiments. Even more importantly, however, our result that L1 and L2 differentially influence 
perception of rotation (Hypothesis 2) would be stronger, if we had controlled for the strategic use of 
linguistic labels. 
 As mentioned earlier, the reason for this is that, ideally, we would like to exclude any explanation of 
our results that involves high-level processes as accounting for the difference in perceived similarity 
of stimuli. Instead, we are interested in low-level processes as an explanation. Thus, controlling for 
the strategic use of linguistic labels would effectively result in removal of one of the most obvious 
confounds related to high-level processing. 
One way to avoid the confound of the strategic use of language labels in the procedure used for 
testing Hypothesis 1 is to ask for similarity ratings relative to some uncategorised shape (adapted from 
Goldstone et al., 2001). The idea here is that, given two shapes A and B belonging to the same 
category in L1 and to different categories in L2 and an uncategorised item E, we predict that, if A and 
B are judged to be more similar in L1 than in L2 (thus, diminishing distance between them in the 
similarity space), then, the difference between similarity judgements between the pair of A and E and 
the pair of B and E will be smaller in L1 compared to L2. A similar way of controlling for the 
strategic use of linguistic labels would need to be invented for stimuli used in testing Hypothesis 2. 
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Another way of controlling for the possibility of the involvement of conceptual processing would be 
to change the type of the similarity judgement task entirely. It has been suggested that the best tasks 
that allow us to control for conceptual processing are perceptual discriminability tasks (Hodgetts, 
Hahn, & Chater, 2009). The following are examples of such tasks that could be used in future 
experiments: 
 an odd-one-out matching triad task, where two most similar stimuli are chosen out of three; 
stimuli are physically equidistant (or equally discriminable) and typically their category 
membership is manipulated to achieve desired CP effects (e.g., Roberson et al., 2000) 
 
 a two-alternative forced choice task, where, on a typical trail, the stimuli consist of two pairs 
of objects and participants are required to say whether similarity between objects in pair 1 is 
greater than in pair 2 (e.g., Roberson et al., 2000; Hodgetts et al., 2009) 
 
 a same/different discrimination task where 2 stimuli are judged as same or different; stimuli 
are physically equidistant (or equally discriminable) and typically their category membership 
is manipulated to achieve desired CP effects (e.g., Goldstone, 1994a) 
 
 an ABX discrimination task where participants are exposed to  stimuli A, B and X in 
succession and required to say whether X was identical to A or B; X is always identical to A 
or B; category membership is manipulated for A and B to achieve desired CP effects (e.g., 
Liberman et al., 1957) 
Although our intention here is not to give exhaustive explanations of perceptual discriminability tasks, 
the above list could serve as starting point for possible future modifications of the current experiment.  
6.3.3 Similarity construct 
When designing the current experiment we assumed that changes in perception can be quantified by 
means of measuring changes in perceived similarity of stimuli. Therefore, when making experimental 
design choices we should have been guided by a psychologically plausible notion of similarity. 
Given the complexity of this problem, which was partially due to the constraints imposed by the 
meaning space from Matthews et al.’s experiment and the inherent ED measure of similarity, we 
designed the similarity judgement task without having any particular, psychologically motivated, 
notion of similarity in mind.  
However, given the non-significant result with respect to Hypothesis 1, it is possible that what was 
needed was a specific notion of psychological similarity to guide our design of stimuli for the 
similarity judgement task. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that recent evidence suggests 
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that geometrical (e.g., Shepard, 1957) or featural accounts of similarity (e.g., Tversky, 1977) are not 
psychologically plausible because they assume that similarity is sensitive to single features of objects 
and not interactions between them. Although to test Hypothesis 2, a single feature of rotation was the 
most relevant, it was unclear which features and featural interactions (e.g., the number of sides and 
pointiness) would be relevant to testing Hypothesis 1. 
Instead of assuming geometrical or featural notion of similarity, recent evidence demonstrates that 
similarity between pairs of geometrical objects is best captured by the number of complex distortions 
that need to be accomplished in order to change one object representation to another (the 
Representational Distortion account – Hahn, Chater, & Richardson, (2003)). In light of this evidence, 
it may be worthwhile to assume the Representational Distortion notion of similarity and design the 
similarity judgement task stimuli accordingly.  
The issue of choosing the most plausible notion of psychological similarity is very complex and hotly 
debated in psychological research (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone, Day, & Son, 2010). Thus, it is 
not our intention to provide a solution to this problem, but merely to suggest its existence, and 
possible relevance to the current experiment.  
6.4 Significance of the experiment to language evolution  
The leading motivation for the current experiment was the idea to conjoin two research fields, 
cognitive psychology and evolutionary linguistics within the ILM with humans, in order to develop a 
pioneering methodology for investigating the influence of language cultural transmission on the 
evolution of semantics (i.e., the co-evolution of language structure and semantics).  
Our study was based on the assumption of the current experiment’s continuity with Matthews et al.’s 
study (cf. § 5.1 for discussion). We designed and performed two analyses to demonstrate evolutionary 
changes in semantics that were driven by cultural transmission of L1 and L2. 
 In the first analysis we took into account differential category boundaries that evolved in L1 and L2 
and hypothesised that perception of stimuli within and across evolved category boundaries should 
differ between the languages. If the differences in perception had been found, on the assumption of 
semantics grounded in perception (Barsalou, 1999), this would demonstrate that two distinct semantic 
systems evolved in L1 and L2. However, the non-significant result with respect to this analysis 
suggests that, although L1 and L2 cultural transmission resulted in the evolution of categorisation in 
Matthews et al.’s study, it might have led to too weak effects of within-category expansion and 
between-category compression that could not result in differential perception of these categories. It is 
relevant to emphasise, however, that this finding does not exclude the possibility that two distinct 
semantic systems evolved as a result of L1 and L2 transmission. 
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In fact, in our second analysis, we have demonstrated that learning languages that evolved two metrics 
of similarity – one that considered rotation relevant (i.e., L1) and the other that did not (i.e., L2) – 
resulted in differential perception of rotated and unrotated stimuli. This finding further implies that 
during language evolution, perception of features that are salient to human perceptual processing 
systems, such as rotation to the visual system, are the first ones to be emphasised, as in L1, or de-
emphasised, as in L2, by evolving language labels. As a consequence, we can conclude that language 
evolution, by working together with human perceptual processing systems, can result in the evolution 
of qualitatively different semantic systems. 
More importantly, however, the finding that cultural transmission of language can result in the 
evolution of different semantic systems suggests that not only does language carry information about 
its structure (e.g., compositionality – cf. Brighton et al., 2005), but also information about how its  
speakers should perceive and understand the world. The corollary of this suggestion should not 
remain underestimated as it indicates that, by shaping semantics, language evolution is committed to 
assuring mutual communicational intelligibility among members of given speech-communities.  
Taking as an example the languages from our study, we can suspect that speakers of L2, for who 
rotation is irrelevant, would be unable to understand why speakers of L1, for who rotation is 
important, think that rotated and unrotated shapes are different. Furthermore, it is worth emphasising 
that common understanding of the world is adaptive as it fosters closer relationships and empathy 
among speech community members. 
 
Although previous experiments with the human ILM have demonstrated the co-evolution of language 
structure and semantics, they have not investigated changes in semantics directly by means of 
psychophysical measures. 
For example, Kirby et al. (2008), using predefined stimuli as a semantics, demonstrated that during 
cultural transmission the semantics changes because parts of its elements are differentiated by gradual 
evolution of structure in strings that correspond to the elements. Furthermore, in Matthews et al.’s (in 
prep.) experiment, semantic systems differed across languages as a result of language transmission 
because we observed their differential organisation from scratch by means of formation of category 
boundaries and propagation of two metrics of similarity. 
However in light of the significant finding in the current experiment, Matthews et al.’s results are 
reinforced because we can conclude that semantic systems in the minds of L1 and L2 speakers 
changed under the influence of respective language learning because we have observed differential 
perception of their elements. Therefore, the uniqueness of our approach in demonstrating co-evolution 
of language structure and semantics consists in the fact that we used a psychophysical measure of 
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changes in semantics – that is – a measure of perceived similarity between objects in the meaning 
space. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of cognitive psychology, it seems that the use of a psychophysical 
measure to demonstrate changes in semantics is more realistic than, for example, the use of abstract 
measures of structure, as in Kirby et al. (2008) and Matthews et al.’s (in prep) studies. This is because 
only the former measure is based on a cognitive psychological assumption that semantics of stimuli is 
grounded in sensorimotor representations that can be probed by measuring perception of these stimuli 
(cf. Chapter 1).  
This point is relevant to research in evolutionary linguistics because it is crucial for findings in this 
field to be grounded in and supported by findings from other scientific disciplines that investigate 
human cognition. Thus, our study, as a step in this important direction, is highly relevant to the field 




Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This study has offered an extension to the experiment by Matthews et al. (in prep.) who modelled 
evolution of categorisation of a continuous meaning space. 
Matthews et al. demonstrated that language transmission within the ILM with human participants can 
lead to formation of category boundaries that are organised according to two metrics of similarity, one 
that recognises rotation of objects as relevant and the other that does not.  
We have demonstrated that language transmission that propagates these two types of similarity 
metrics results in differential perception of rotated and unrotated objects. 
This result is unprecedented in that it demonstrates the influence of language structure on semantics 
during language transmission by means of directly measuring cross-linguistic differences in perceived 
similarity between rotated and unrotated objects.   
The current result has two major implications. Firstly, it demonstrates that not only can language 
evolution result in the emergence of different category systems (Matthews et al. in prep.) or 
compositionality (e.g., Kirby et al., 2008), but that it can also shape our conceptual system and the 
way we think about the world. This means that, by influencing semantics, language evolution acts as 
adaptive ‘social glue’ (Dijksterhuis, 2005:208) that fosters development of communicational 
intelligibility among all members of a given speech community and, as a result, improves within-
community integrity.  
Secondly, our finding supports linguistic relativity, according to which the language we speak 
influences our perceptual and conceptual systems. Although the theory of linguistic relativity is not 
new and has been vastly tested by psychologists in recent decades, there is a way whereby our result 
sheds new light on this approach. Linguistic relativity is usually tested with real natural languages 
considered synchronically, whereas the current result demonstrates cross-linguistic differences in 
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Appendix A1: Categorisations of the 100-element meaning space generated by a perfect learner 
acquiring L1 
Appendix A2: Categorisations of the 100-element meaning space generated by a perfect learner 
acquiring L2 
Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Welcome to Alpha-3–6a in a galaxy far, far away. 
We have encountered an intelligent alien life form with its own form of 
language. You must try to learn this language as best you can. 
Don’t worry if you feel overwhelmed—the alien knows that 
this is a difficult task for you to master, and it will do its best to 
understand everything that you say. 
(When you are ready to continue, press ENTER). 
 
You will see a series of pictures and the way in which the alien would describe those pictures. 
Every now and then the alien will test your knowledge of the language by showing you 
a picture without any description. Simply write what you think the correct label is and press 
(ENTER). 
The alien will also want to know if you see pictures how he does. 
So at some point it will ask you to judge the similarity between pairs of pictures. 
DON'T WORRY IF YOU FEEL YOU HAVE NOT YET MASTERED THE LANGUAGE! 
The most important thing is to maintain good relations with the aliens and give it your best shot. 
ALWAYS GIVE AN ANSWER. That way the aliens will know you are trying. 
They will go out of their way to try to understand everything you say and they are very patient. 
You will be given a break every few minutes. 
If you have any questions please ask the experimenter now. 
GOOD LUCK! 
(press ENTER to start the tuition) 
 
Appendix C
Shape pairs categorized as Same in L1 and Different in L2
33 63 31 61
77 80 15 45
86 89 53 83
63 93 64 67
14 44 97 100
41 71 61 91
20 50 13 43
61 83 18 36
41 63 52 74
77 99 56 74
67
80 98 7 29
66 84 76 94
31 53 14 36
62 84 70 88
Shape pairs categorized as Different in L1 and Same in L2
24 54 47 77
22 25 27 30
33 36 41 44
42 45 46 49
68
51 54 52 55
56 59 57 60
65 68 76 79
35 53 14 32
50 68 59 77
4 22 48 66
34 52 55 77
49 67 76 98
9 27 69 87
3 25 33 55
69
Pairs with rotated and unrotated shapes
1 100 2 99
11 90 3 98
21 80 4 97
31 70 91 10
81 20 92 9
71 30 93 8
61 40 94 7
41 60 51 50
5 96 6 95
12 89 13 88
70
22 79 82 19
72 29 18 83
71
